

# Cameron S. LaPoint

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## ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Assistant Professor of Finance, **Yale School of Management** July 2020 –

Research Associate, **Columbia Business School** July 2020 –  
Center on Japanese Economy & Business

## EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, **Columbia University**, May 2020

Dissertation Committee:

David Weinstein (chair), Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Wojciech Kopczuk, Jón Steinsson, Michael Best

B.A., *magna cum laude*, **University of Rochester**, May 2013

Economics, Mathematics, and History

Honors and Highest Distinction in Economics and History

## RESEARCH FIELDS

**Primary:** Corporate Finance, Real Estate, Macroeconomics

**Secondary:** Urban Economics, Public Finance, Household Finance

## WORKING PAPERS

**You Only Lend Twice: Corporate Borrowing and Land Values in Real Estate Cycles**

*2020 AREUEA Homer Hoyt Dissertation Award (1st Prize)*

*2019 BlackRock Applied Research Award (Finalist)*

This paper uses a natural experiment in Japan to provide evidence of the feedback loop between corporate borrowing and commercial real estate investment emphasized in macro-finance models with collateral constraints. Japan enacted a series of reforms in the early 1980s which relaxed national regulatory constraints on the height and size of buildings. Combining originally-constructed local commercial land price indices for over 400 localities with geocoded firm balance sheets, I show that these land use deregulations generated a boom-bust cycle in corporate real estate values, borrowing, and real estate investment. Firms located in more *ex ante* land use constrained areas both issued more debt and invested more heavily in real estate, thus amplifying the initial positive shock to commercial real estate prices. I develop a multi-city spatial sorting model with production externalities and real estate collateral which uses the estimated reduced form effects of my local regulatory instruments on firm outcomes to assess aggregate effects of the reform. I find that the deregulatory shock to commercial real estate markets and corporate borrowing environment amplified the real estate cycle in the 1980s and led to an increased incidence of zombie lending in the 1990s.

**Winners, Losers, and Near-Rationality: Heterogeneity in the MPC out of a Large Stimulus Tax Rebate**  
(joint with Takashi Unayama – submitted)  
[RIETI Discussion Paper, No. 20-E-067](#)

We document heterogeneous spending out of a large stimulus tax rebate by household exposure to the 1980s Japanese housing market turbulence. We find recipients in areas with mild housing booms during the 1980s spent 47% of the 1994 tax rebate within a quarter, compared to 24% in areas with the largest booms. MPCs are highest for young renters without debt. Our findings are consistent with near-rationality rather than a liquidity constraint story. Winners who are less exposed to housing risk respond more to payments, implying policies which target losers from housing market downturns may be less effective at stimulating consumption.

**Flip or Flop? Tobin Taxes in the Real Estate Market** (*joint with Chun-Che Chi & Ming-Jen Lin*)

We estimate the optimal tax on property flips by applying a sufficient statistics approach to a 2011 reform in Taiwan which levied a 10%-15% surcharge on investment properties sold within two years. Linking buyer-seller income tax returns to sales records, we find a 75% drop in one-year flips. We use variation in typhoon severity to classify 20% of pre-reform sales as noisy. Combining these two parameters, the optimal tax rate is 4%, which is close to the transfer tax rates imposed in many global property markets. Segmentation and inventory shifts limit the ability of Tobin taxes to promote housing affordability.

**Coming in at a Trickle: The Optimal Frequency of Public Benefit Payments** (*joint with Shogo Sakabe*)

How governments should choose the frequency of payments has received little attention in the literature on the optimal design of benefits programs. We propose a simple model in which the government chooses the interval length between payments, subject to a tradeoff between costs of providing more frequent benefits and welfare gains from mitigating consumption non-smoothing. Using a high-frequency retail dataset that links consumers to their purchase history, we apply the model to the Japanese National Pension System. Our evidence suggests suboptimal intra-cycle consumption patterns, with negligible retailer price discrimination. Model calibrations support the worldwide prevalence of monthly payment systems.

## WORKS IN PROGRESS

The Value of Control: Asset Ownership and Inheritance Tax Planning (*joint with Lorenzo Pessina*)

Microbubbles and Local Property Tax Regimes (*joint with Takashi Unayama*)

Place-based Policies and the Spatial Distribution of Corporate Investment (*joint with Shogo Sakabe*)

Delaying the Honeymoon: The Great Decline in American Vacation

## TEACHING

Real Estate Finance (MBA Elective), Yale SOM, Spring 2021

Public Economics (Undergraduate), Columbia, Summer 2017

## FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS & HONORS

AREUEA Homer Hoyt Doctoral Dissertation Award (1st Prize), 2020

Urban Economics Association Student Paper Prize (Honorable Mention), 2020

BlackRock Applied Research Award (Finalist), 2019

C. Lowell Harriss Dissertation Fellowship, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2019–20

Center on Japanese Economy and Business Sumitomo Fellowship, 2017–18

GSAS Lead Teaching Fellowship, Columbia University, 2016–17

Wueller Teaching Award for best Principles of Economics TA, Columbia, 2016

Honorable Mention, NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, 2015  
 GSAS Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University, 2014–19  
 Fulbright Japan Research Fellowship, Kyoto University, 2013–14  
 Phi Beta Kappa, 2013  
 Wilder Trustee Scholarship, Rochester, 2009 – 2013

## INVITED SEMINARS & PRESENTATIONS

**2021:** International Online Public Finance Seminar†, CUNY Baruch†, SFS Cavalcade\*†, Financial Intermediation Research Society (FIRS)\*†, ITAM Finance Conference\*†, UEA Europe\*†

**2020:** NYU Stern, Yale SOM (×2), Yale, Wharton (Real Estate), McGill (Desautels), Notre Dame (Mendoza), Wisconsin (Real Estate), Wesleyan, NY Fed, Richmond Fed, AREUEA National Conference†, Japan Empirical Economics Seminar (Osaka U)†, VMACS Junior Conference†, CREDA Real Estate Research Symposium (UNC Kenan-Flagler)†, NBER Japan Project Meeting‡, Urban Economics Association (UEA) Annual Meeting†, Queen's University Belfast†, AREUEA Virtual Seminar†

*\*scheduled †virtual ‡cancelled*

**2019:** Young Economists Symposium (Columbia), 7th Annual Warwick Economics PhD Conference, Columbia Business School, BlackRock, Cornerstone

**2018:** National Tax Association Annual Meeting, Hitotsubashi University

**2017:** Hitotsubashi University

## DISCUSSIONS

**2020/21:** National Tax Association Annual Meeting†, ASSA Annual Meeting†, Yale Junior Finance Conference†

*\*scheduled †virtual*

## PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

**Yale Service:** Junior Finance Conference Organizer (2020-21) Finance Seminar Organizer (2020–21)

**Journal Referee:** *Review of Financial Studies*, *Journal of Public Economics*, *Journal of Housing Economics*

## OTHER

**Computing:** GIS, MATLAB, R, SAS, Stata

**Languages:** English (native), Japanese (proficient), French (working)

**Citizenship:** United States